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Kentucky to Become a “Second Paradise” for SameSex Married Couples

Daniel Boone was determined to bring his family “as soon as
possible to live in Kentucky, which I esteemed a second paradise, at the risk of my life and fortune.” With a
recent ruling (http://sblog.s3.amazonaws.com/wpcontent/uploads/2014/02/Kentuckymarriagerecognitioinruling2
12141.pdf) by a federal judge that Kentucky is constitutionally required to give effect to samesex marriages
from other states, this determination may be shared by gay and lesbian couples seeking a refuge anywhere south
of the Mason Dixon line.
The court’s ruling in Bourke v. Beshear concludes that whether or not a state has the power to refuse to authorize
samesex marriages on its own turf, it does not have the constitutional power to refuse to recognize those that are
validly celebrated elsewhere. Bourke joins a growing number of cases in which recognition issues are at the
forefront, a trend ignited by the Supreme Court’s ruling last year in United States v. Windsor
(http://supreme.justia.com/cases/federal/us/570/12307/) , which found fault in the federal government’s decision to
single out samesex marriages for nonrecognition.
The Claim in Bourke and Kentucky Law on SameSex Marriage
This lawsuit was brought by four samesex couples—married, respectively, in Canada, Iowa, California, and
Connecticut. Two of the four couples are raising children, and one has been together for 44 years. They are, in
the court’s estimation, “average, stable American families.”
Although each couple was validly married in another jurisdiction, none is entitled to have their unions recognized
under Kentucky law. Kentucky, like more than forty other states, got swept up in the antisamesexmarriage
backlash to the possibility, in the early 1990s, that Hawaii might imminently legalize samesex marriage. (Hawaii
did ultimately legalize samesex marriage, but not for 20 more years and not until many other states had already
done so.)
In 1998, Kentucky adopted a new law that prohibited samesex marriages from celebration in Kentucky, declared
samesex marriage contrary to public policy, and declared samesex marriages from other jurisdictions void and
unenforceable in Kentucky. Then, in 2004, Kentucky voters ratified an amendment to the state’s constitution,
which provided that “Only a marriage between one man and one woman shall be valid or recognized as a
marriage in Kentucky. A legal status identical or substantially similar to that of marriage for unmarried
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individuals shall not be valid or recognized.” Thus, both the Kentucky Code and the Kentucky Constitution
categorically deny recognition to samesex marriages (and civil unions or other marriage alternatives) that were
validly celebrated in other states.
The plaintiffcouples argued—successfully, it turns out—that Kentucky’s legal framework denies them rights
and benefits enjoyed by other married couples in violation of the federal Constitution. Marriage, as the fight over
samesex marriage has made clear, is the determinant of innumerable tangible benefits, involving issues such as
taxes, inheritance, wrongful death suits, family leave, and Social Security. It is also, in the plaintiffs’ words, a
source of “dignity and status of immense import,” the denial of which is both stigmatizing and destabilizing.
Marriage Recognition Law
It’s important when thinking about samesex marriage to distinguish between (1) the law governing the
celebration of marriage—that is, the law that determines whether a particular state will let couples within its
borders marry, and (2) the recognition of marriage—that is, whether a particular state will give effect to a
marriage that it would not itself have permitted, but that was validly celebrated in another jurisdiction. These
might seem like closely related areas of law, but, historically, they have developed differently.
Marriage has always been regulated largely at the state level, and states have not always agreed about who should
be allowed to marry and when. In our federal system, with everincreasing mobility, these disagreements gave
rise to conflicts about the portability of marital status. Are people still married if they move to, travel through, or
return home to a state that would not have allowed them to marry in the first instance?
The traditional answer to that question was typically “Yes,” with some exceptions. Every state followed some
version of the “place of celebration” rule, which provides that marriages that are valid where celebrated are valid
everywhere and, conversely, marriages void where celebrated are void everywhere. The general rule was subject
to exceptions for marriages that were considered “universally abhorrent” or in violation of natural law, as well as
for marriages that are in violation of some positive law deeming them void. The first exception was typically
applied only to marriages that were bigamous or closely incestuous; the second was applied most commonly to
evasive marriages—ones where a couple leaves their home state to evade its marriage laws and then returns
expecting recognition of their marriage—if the state legislature had adopted an antievasion law.
Under the traditional rules, most states have given effect to commonlaw marriages, underage marriages, and
firstcousin marriages even if their own laws do not permit such marriages to be celebrated. The deference to the
marriages of sister states has been granted as a matter of comity, or respect, rather than being due to a
constitutional mandate of full faith and credit.
If we were simply to apply the conventional interstate recognition rules to samesex marriage, we would see a
strong likelihood of recognition in states that do not permit samesex marriage, at least for nonevasive samesex
marriages. What we saw, instead, was the erection of an entirely new, unprecedented set of rules that was
specifically designed to fend off samesex marriages from other jurisdictions—and designed to remove the
question of recognition from courts. Kentucky’s law is an example of this unprecedented approach.
DOMA and United States v. Windsor
The federal Defense of Marriage Act (DOMA) is also an example of a categorical nonrecognition law, which
refused recognition for all federallaw purposes to valid samesex marriages. The Supreme Court’s invalidation
of DOMA on constitutional grounds in June 2013 (which I have written about in more detail here
(http://verdict.justia.com/2013/06/26/domaisdead) and here (http://verdict.justia.com/2013/09/03/fallingdominoes
samesexspousesgainmorerecognitionrights) ) fuels cases like Bourke.
In Windsor, the Court struck down DOMA on equal protection grounds. Although Justice Kennedy noted that
Congress has the power to make determinations of marital rights and privileges, as it does, for example, in
immigration law, it has traditionally deferred to statelaw determinations of marital status for purposes of
implementing almost every federal law.
http://verdict.justia.com/2014/02/18/kentuckybecomesecondparadisesexmarriedcouples
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The problem with DOMA is not that it chose not to defer to the states, but that it chose to single out a single type
of marriage for a broadbased set of disabilities. As the Court had held in Romer v. Evans
(http://supreme.justia.com/cases/federal/us/517/620/case.html) , “[d]iscriminations of an unusual character especially
suggest careful consideration to determine whether they are obnoxious to the constitutional provision.” In other
words, the federal government’s departure from the longstanding tradition of deference to state regulation of
marriage makes it suspect, and suggestive of the inference that it reflected bare animus against a politically
unpopular group. DOMA, in the Court’s view, worked a variety of harms on legallymarried couples, including
the diminishment of “the stability and predictability of basic personal relations the State has found it proper to
acknowledge and protect;” the undermining of “the public and private significance of statesanctioned
marriages;” and the humiliation of “tens of thousands of children now being raised by samesex couples.”
The Ruling in Bourke v. Beshear
The question in Bourke is whether, in the wake of Windsor, states can retain their own categorical rules of non
recognition with regard to outofstate marriages, particularly if they otherwise give effect to prohibited
marriages from out of state. In one recent case, Obergefell v. Wymyslo (http://docs.justia.com/cases/federal/district
courts/ohio/ohsdce/1:2013cv00501/164617/65) , a federal judge in Ohio held that the state could not enforce its non
recognition rule against samesex marriages for purposes of issuing a death certificate for a man who was legally
married in another state. That case is currently pending on appeal.
Bourke raises a broader version of that question: Can Kentucky deny marriage recognition for any purpose under
state law? The court ruled that Kentucky’s nonrecognition law violates the Equal Protection Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment.
To reach that conclusion, the court first discussed the appropriate standard of review. Although it seemed
convinced that heightened scrutiny is appropriate both because of the importance of the right at stake and because
of the historical disadvantage of the group affected, the court felt constrained by the failure of either the Sixth
Circuit Court of Appeals or the United States Supreme Court (its superiors, judicially) to articulate a heightened
standard of review in sexualorientation discrimination or samesex marriage cases. It thus applied the lowest
level of review, asking only whether Kentucky had a rational reason to deny recognition to samesex marriages.
But the court applied rational basis review in the spirit of Romer v. Evans
(http://supreme.justia.com/cases/federal/us/517/620/) , the 1996 case in which the Supreme Court struck down—
under an ostensibly deferential standard of review—a Colorado referendum that specifically disadvantaged only
gays and lesbians. This means that the search for a rational relationship ensures that “classifications are not
drawn for the purpose of disadvantaging the group burdened by the law.”
The judge in Bourke was most influenced, however, by the majority opinion in Windsor, the principles of
which,it said, “strongly suggest the result here.”
Like DOMA, the judge noted, Kentucky’s nonrecognition law’s “principal effect is to identify a subset of state
sanctioned marriages and make them unequal. The principal purpose is to impose inequality, not for other
reasons like governmental efficiency.”
Moreover, the court noted, the Kentucky law mimics DOMA by demeaning “one group by depriving them of
rights provided for others.”
Moreover, the harms caused by DOMA apply with even greater force at the state level, where marital status is the
determinant of an even greater number of rights and benefits. As the Bourke judge observed, “Justice Kennedy’s
analysis [in Windsor] would seem to command that a law refusing to recognize valid outofstate samesex
marriages has only one effect: to impose inequality.”
Although the court could have stopped with its discussion of Windsor and its conclusion that the mere desire to
harm is insufficient to sustain a state law, it continued on with a discussionsof the right to marry (not just the
right to have a marriage recognized by a sister state) and offered a series of answers to the questions and concerns
http://verdict.justia.com/2014/02/18/kentuckybecomesecondparadisesexmarriedcouples

3/5

11/21/2014

Kentucky to Become a “Second Paradise” for SameSex Married Couples | Joanna L. Grossman | Verdict | Legal Analysis and Commentary from Justia

that might arise from a ruling that “clashes with many accepted norms in Kentucky—both in society and in
faith.”
First, the court acknowledged the Kentuckian belief in traditional marriage, one that is heavily, if not exclusively,
informed by religious teachings on marriage. But while those religious beliefs are “vital to the fabric of society,”
the law must operate “outside that protected sphere.” The law cannot, the court declared, “impose a traditional or
faithbased limitation upon a public right without a sufficient justification for it.”
Second, the court answered likely questions about religious freedom. For example, would churches be required to
marry samesex couples? The court reassures Kentuckians that whether the state could constitutionally prohibit
samesex marriages from being celebrated in Kentucky was not before the court (although the court’s analysis
wades into that territory). And even if the state ban is struck down in a future case, “no court can require
churches or other religious institutions to marry samesex couples or any other couple . . . [as] part of our
constitutional guarantee of freedom of religion.”
Third, the court noted that some might question the power of a single judge to override the laws resulting from a
democratic process. But while states once had “wide latitude to codify their traditional and moral values into
law,” the Fourteenth Amendment clearly curtails that power. And [the tenet] that judges have final say on the
meaning of the constitution and the individual rights it guarantees “is the way of our Constitution.”
Finally, the court anticipated critics who might accuse judges of creating new rights, a change that appears to be
“happening so suddenly.” For those critics, the judge offered reassurance that our understanding of the
Constitution has always been an evolving one. And while the changes in the realm of samesex marriage might
seem sudden, the jurisprudence that led to them has been developing for almost half a century since the Supreme
Court’s invalidation of interracial marriage bans in Loving v. Virginia (1967) (discussed in more detail here
(http://writ.lp.findlaw.com/grossman/20070530.html) ). It took the Supreme Court 46 years to get from Loving to
Romer to Lawrence v. Texas to Windsor, and each of these small steps leads to the result in Bourke.
Conclusion
Although there have been many watershed moments in the battle over samesex marriage, the Court’s ruling in
Windsor may turn out to be the most significant of all. If Windsor means, as two federal courts have now said,
that states cannot deny recognition to samesex marriages from elsewhere consistent with equal protection
principles, then the battle over samesex marriage is all but over. By long tradition, states do not require
residency for marriage (although they do for divorce), so residents of any state can legally marry in any other
state. And if those marriages must be recognized when couples return home, move, or travel through an anti
samesex marriage state, then the refusal of some states to allow the celebration of samesex marriage in the first
instance has little practical consequence.
And the end of the controversy may be hastened still by rulings like the one in Virginia just last week. A federal
judge, in Bostic v. Rainey, concluded that the state’s statutory and constitutional bans on the celebration and
recognition of samesex marriage are unconstitutional under federal due process and equal protection principles.
If that ruling survives appeal, Virginia must not only give effect to outofstate samesex marriages, as is true in
Kentucky, but must allow them to be celebrated in the first instance.
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